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Joined 25 days ago
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Cake day: July 3rd, 2025

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  • Ah. Yeah, nuke it from orbit. Since this was RAT, so it had local execution powers and the attackers knew exactly which distro they are targetting, they could have used some security vulnerability to get root and even replace the kernel in worst case. Hopefully not microcode insertion, so hardware could be ok

    But then, it wasn’t an attack on an existing package. So the question is how many people did actually download those


  • Ah, you mean for fediverse to work as an LDAP?

    My point is Let’s imagine we have a board on some instance. You use your account on another instance to ask the owner of the board to give you access to the board. The contents of the board are, IMO in most cases of such boards, “members only”. So any changes happening inside should not be sent out to federating instances. Otherwise, privacy of such boards would be at the mercy of privacy of other instances. If restricted changes were sent out, technically speaking, any server it federates to can choose to show that content to everyone. Which means you won’t be able to access the contents via any other instance. Apart from the logging in part, you will still need to go to the instance hosting the board. Unless it would be for publicly accessible boards only, like codeberg issues. That use-case could work


  • It was AUR. The way AUR works is that there is a PKGBUILD file that tells pacman how to compile a package from scratch. It can be created in a way where nothing gets compiled, only precompiled binary is downloaded (like from github releases). So it was not a package in purely Arch sense. With those PKGBUILDs out from AUR, malicious binaries only sit on their github, or wherever those were hosted, and are not reachable via alternative package managers (pacman, the official one, doesn’t offer AUR at all)